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In the last two decades, many countries have
launched extensive privatization programs.
There is now a growing body of literature on
the eﬀects of privatization on productive eﬃ-
ciency. We contribute to this literature in three
ways. First, we present a complete picture of
privatization as we analyze the eﬀects of priv-
atization on both productive and allocative
(market) eﬃciency using data from the Turkish
cement industry. Second, our analysis goes be-
yond examining the privatization eﬀects and ex-
plores how privatization really works. Is it the
changing objectives due to private ownership
or a change in the competitive environment
that causes possible eﬃciency gains? By focus-
ing on this question, we aim to provide insights
to researchers and policymakers in their analy-153sis/design of other privatization experiments.
Third, our data set enables us to avoid the end-
ogeneity problem associated with sample selec-
tion. All public cement plants in Turkey have
been privatized and we have pre- and post-priv-
atization data for all.
Privatization eﬀorts in Turkey, fueled by the
forces of globalization, started in 1985. The
given motivations for privatization were to
relieve the state of the burdens of ineﬃcient7
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revenue for the government. Although the priv-
atization process in Turkey has started earlier
than in most developing countries, its pro-
gress—measured in terms of the size of divesti-
ture—has been slower compared with the
principal Latin American and Eastern Euro-
pean cases (Ercan & Onis, 2001). Since its start
in 1985, the total proceeds from privatization
eﬀorts have amounted to $9.4 billion by 2005.
Turkey is an important country in the cement
sector. It is the largest exporter and third larg-
est producer of cement in Europe and second
largest exporter and 12th largest producer of
cement in the world (OAIB, Cimento Sektoru
Raporu, 2003). 1 The industry can be consid-
ered an oligopoly since ownership is concen-
trated and due to high transportation costs
each plant has some monopoly power in its
hinterland. According to Shirley and Walsh
(2001), both the theoretical literature and the
empirical literature are not conclusive about
the merits of private ownership in monopolistic
markets.
The economic theory of privatization is a
subset of the vast body of literature concerning
the economics of ownership and the role for
government ownership of productive resources.
There are two main branches in this literature:
The Social View (Shapiro & Willig, 1990) and
the Agency View (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994;
Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). In this paper, we
identify the predictions of the existing models
of ownership and empirically test the validity
of these predictions.
Our results show that privatization increases
labor productivity and decreases prices signiﬁ-
cantly, indicating an improvement in both pro-
ductive and allocative eﬃciency. Our results on
productive eﬃciency are robust to controlling
for changes in the competitive environment
(market structure), while privatization no
longer has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on prices in the
presence of this control. We ﬁnd evidence that
technology becomes more capital intensive for
plants privatized to foreign ﬁrms as all the
three, capital endowment, investment and cap-
ital labor ratios, increase for these plants while
plants purchased by domestic ﬁrms do not
experience a signiﬁcant increase in their invest-
ment and capital levels.
These results are not biased due to sample
selection problems, since all public cement
plants in Turkey were privatized and we have
pre- and post-privatization data for all. Due
to data limitations, the empirical literature onprivatization typically presents studies of par-
tial privatization experiments in which some
of the ﬁrms in the analysis are privatized while
others remain public. Hence, it is arguable that
ﬁrms selected for privatization might have
unobserved characteristics that could have af-
fected results.
Most existing empirical studies on privatiza-
tion either compare private and public ﬁrms
at the same point in time or are gathered from
studies of privatization of the before–after vari-
ety examining the averages of key variables
before and after privatization and testing
for signiﬁcant changes. Cross-sectional studies
may have diﬃculty in controlling for ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc eﬀects, while before–after studies may fail
to control for period-speciﬁc eﬀects. We con-
tribute to this literature by fully controlling
for ﬁrm and time speciﬁc eﬀects using a ﬁxed
eﬀect panel data estimator.
In Section 2, we review the theoretical and
the empirical literature on privatization. Sec-
tion 3 describes the privatization environment
and the cement industry in Turkey. Section 4
describes our data. Section 5 presents the
econometric framework. Section 6 presents
and discusses the results and Section 7
concludes.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
(a) Theoretical literature on privatization
The economic theory of privatization is a
subset of the vast body of literature examining
the economics of ownership and the role of
government ownership of productive resources.
There are two main branches in this literature:
The Social View and the Agency View.
According to the Social View (Shapiro &
Willig, 1990), state owned enterprises (SOEs)
are capable of curing market failures by imple-
menting pricing policies that take account of
social marginal costs and beneﬁts of produc-
tion. A privately owned ﬁrm is expected to
maximize proﬁts, whereas a state owned ﬁrm
is expected to maximize social welfare. For
example, in a natural monopoly market struc-
ture, eﬃciency calls for a single ﬁrm to exist.
A proﬁt maximizing monopoly will, however,
charge too high a price and produce too low
a quantity. This potential ineﬃciency can be
solved by state ownership.
The Agency View of ﬁrm ownership presents
a strong critique of this theory. There are two
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diﬀer as to whether the agency conﬂict is with
the manager or the politician. Vickers and Yar-
row (1988) argue that managers of SOEs may
lack high-powered incentives or proper moni-
toring. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) stress that
political interference in the ﬁrm results in exces-
sive employment, poor choices of product and
location, lack of investments and ill-deﬁned
incentives for managers.
The Social View unequivocally predicts that
eﬃcient technology will be chosen by state
owned ﬁrms. Models of Agency View, on the
other hand, while predicting that ineﬃcient
technologies will be chosen by politicians/man-
agers, have diﬀerent predictions for the direction
of the distortion in the production process. They
either predict that state owned ﬁrms will have
low investment levels (Shleifer & Vishny,
1994), or that they will use excess capital as well
as excess labor (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). The
over-capitalization argument stems from
bureaucratic ineﬃciency models. The founder
of this line of literature, Niskanen (1975), pro-
posed that bureaucrats are inclined to maximize
their total budget rather than the utility of their
sponsors. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that
the bureaucrats will subject the state owned ﬁrm
to over-investment and over-capitalization to
justify high salaries and perks.
On allocative eﬃciency, the Social View pre-
dicts that prices are likely to rise as a result of
privatization. The Agency View, on the other
hand, predicts that if a reasonable degree of
competition ensues, then allocative eﬃciency
may actually increase as ﬁrms increase their
productivity after privatization. In this paper,
we test the models of the Social View and of
the Agency View by empirically examining
whether privatization improves allocative eﬃ-
ciency and ﬁrm productivity. We further diﬀer-
entiate between the two models of the Agency
View by examining how privatization aﬀects a
ﬁrm’s capital endowment.
(b) Empirical literature on privatization
(i) Privatization and productive eﬃciency
Firm performance has been the focus of the
empirical literature on privatization. Studies ci-
ted in a survey of empirical studies of privatiza-
tion almost unanimously report increases in
ﬁrm performance associated with privatization
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). 2 In another re-
view of the literature, Shirley and Walsh
(2001) ﬁnd greater ambiguity about privatiza-tion in theoretical literature than in the empiri-
cal literature and they conclude that empirical
literature strongly favors privatization in com-
petitive markets. However, ambiguity of the
theoretical literature about ownership in less
competitive markets seems better justiﬁed since
the empirical literature is also less conclusive on
the eﬀects of ownership in such markets. Most
of these studies surveyed in review articles com-
pare post-privatization performance changes
with either a comparison group of non-priv-
atized ﬁrms or compare three year mean/
median performance of privatized ﬁrms to their
own mean/median performance during their
last three years as state owned ﬁrms.
Critics of these ﬁndings are quick to point out
that all of the gains researchers have docu-
mented after privatization are due to selection
bias. The argument is that better ﬁrms are priv-
atized ﬁrst and their comparison to more poorly
performing ﬁrms that happen to remain public
gives a spurious relationship between privati-
zation and ﬁrm performance. Cross-sectional
studies may not be able to satisfactorily control
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects and therefore address the
selection problem for privatization. While com-
paring before and after three year averages of
performance measures might be less biased,
even that method may not entirely solve the
selection problem. One could argue that those
ﬁrms would have improved at any rate even if
they were not privatized or other reforms that
accompany the privatization process may have
been responsible for the changes observed (Om-
ran, 2004). When Omran compares before and
after privatization averages of performance
measures of privatized ﬁrms from Egypt, he
ﬁnds a signiﬁcant increase in performance. But
when he carries out the same exercise for ﬁrms
that remain state owned, he ﬁnds that they also
improve after the privatization period though
they themselves are not privatized. Either the
improvement of privatized ﬁrms has spillover ef-
fects on state-owned ﬁrms or privatization has
nothing to do with the changes observed. The
author suggests that other economic reforms
that enhanced the competitive environment in
which his sample of privatized and state-owned
ﬁrms was operating might have been responsible
for his ﬁndings.
Some recent studies control for unobserved
ﬁrm heterogeneity using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in a
panel data analysis (Earle & Telegdy, 2002;
Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu, & Lutter,
1994; Frydman, Gray, Hessel, & Rapaczynski,
1999; Villalonga, 2000; Wallsten, 2001). The
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ﬁrm performance are mixed. Ehrlich et al.
(1994) use a sample of 23 comparable interna-
tional airlines of diﬀerent ownership categories
over the period 1973–83. Their results suggest
that private ownership leads to higher rates of
productivity growth and declining costs in the
long run, and that these diﬀerences are not af-
fected by the regulatory environment. Their
estimates suggest that the short-run eﬀects of
changes from state to private ownership on
productivity and costs are ambiguous.
Villalonga (2000) examines 24 Spanish ﬁrms
from diﬀerent industries and ﬁnds that privati-
zation does not increase ﬁrm eﬃciency (deﬁned
as rate of return on assets). She argues that
political factors such as the business cycle dur-
ing which the ﬁrm is privatized and foreign
ownership are important determinants of ﬁrm
eﬃciency. Wallsten (2001) ﬁnds that in the tele-
communications sector, privatization by itself
does not appear to generate many beneﬁts
and is negatively correlated with main line pen-
etration. He points out the importance of regu-
latory framework ensuing from privatization as
he ﬁnds that privatization combined with the
existence of a separate regulator is correlated
with increased connection capacity and labor
eﬃciency as measured by employees per main
line.
Earle and Telegdy (2002) ﬁnd that privati-
zation increases labor productivity growth in
their heterogeneous sample of Romanian ﬁrms.
Frydman et al. (1999) ﬁnd that privatization to
outsider owners including foreigners has signi-
ﬁcant eﬀects on revenue performance, but not
on cost reduction using data from the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland, of 218 state
owned ﬁrms, of which 128 were privatized
during the period from 1990 to 1994.
We contribute to the literature on the eﬀects
of privatization on ﬁrm performance in three
important ways: (1) we control for ﬁrm and
time ﬁxed eﬀects in our baseline regressions,
(2) our sample allows us to control for endo-
geneity which has been a problem for previous
research, and (3) we assess the eﬀects of owner-
ship on ﬁrm performance in an oligopolistic
market. According to a review article by Shirley
and Walsh (2001), the empirical literature is
not conclusive on the eﬀects of ownership in
less competitive markets.
(ii) Privatization and allocative eﬃciency
Studies that examine the eﬀect of privatiza-
tion on allocative eﬃciency are rare (Meggin-son & Netter, 2001). These studies typically
ﬁnd that prices either increase or do not change
after privatization. La Porta and Lopez-de-Sil-
anes (1999) analyze Mexican ﬁrms from a vari-
ety of industries and ﬁnd that consumer prices
increase after privatization. In their analysis
of the water and sewerage industry of England
and Wales, Saal and Parker (2001) ﬁnd that
output prices increase, and furthermore, total
price performance indices reveal that increases
in output prices have outstripped increases in
input costs. On the other hand, in a cross-coun-
try panel study of the telecommunications sec-
tor, Wallsten (2001) ﬁnds that prices are not
correlated with privatization but are negatively
correlated with competition; measured by the
number of mobile operators not owned by the
incumbent.
It is unrealistic to expect that the eﬀects of
privatization on prices will be the same in
every industry. Market structure of an industry
(market power of ﬁrms in the industry) as well
as ﬁrms’ productivity will aﬀect consumer
prices. In our study, we contribute to this liter-
ature by striving to diﬀerentiate the eﬀects of
private ownership from the changes in market
structure and competitive environment in-
duced by privatization and other economic
reforms.
(iii) Privatization and input choice
Empirical studies of privatization do not di-
rectly examine the changes in input choice
resulting from privatization. Rather, they re-
port changes in employment and capital in-
vestment, which may suggest a change in
technology. In their survey article, Megginson
and Netter (2001) report that almost all of the
22 studies from non-transition economies that
they review ﬁnd that capital investment spend-
ing increases signiﬁcantly as ﬁrms are priv-
atized. Perhaps surprisingly, they report that
these studies are far less unanimous regarding
the impact of privatization on employment
levels in privatized ﬁrms.
La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), in
their study of 233 privatized Mexican ﬁrms,
ﬁnd that the ratios of investment to sales and
investment to ﬁxed assets signiﬁcantly increase
after privatization while employment signiﬁ-
cantly decreases.
Bhaskar and Khan (1995) ﬁnd that privatiza-
tion has a large and signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on white-collar workers using employment data
from Bangladesh, for 62 jute mills of which 31
were privatized.
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analyzing how capital, investment and employ-
ment and capital labor ratios change for priv-
atized ﬁrms in the Turkish cement industry.
(iv) Privatization and market structure
Few studies have sought to estimate the ef-
fects of market structure along with privatiza-
tion. These studies typically include some type
of measure for market concentration as an
additional control when they measure the ef-
fects of privatization on ﬁrm productivity. In
general, they do not analyze how privatization
aﬀects market structure or how changes in mar-
ket structure aﬀect allocative eﬃciency. Angel-
ucci, Estrin, Konings, and Zolkiewski (2001)
analyze the eﬀects of competitive pressures
(measured by Herﬁndahl index (HHI) and
share of imports in sales) and ownership
changes on productivity in Bulgaria, Poland,
and Romania. Anderson, Lee, and Murrell
(2000) analyze the eﬀects of competition and
ownership on the productivity of the newly
privatized enterprises using data from Mongo-
lia. Kattuman and Domanski (1997) analyze
market concentration as a result of mass priv-
atization in Poland and ﬁnd that concentration
rapidly increases in several markets. Warzynski
(2003) in his study of 300 Ukrainian ﬁrms ﬁnds
that competition does not have a signiﬁcant ef-
fect on ﬁrm performance measured by produc-
tivity and proﬁtability, while privatization has a
marginal positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on proﬁt-
ability and an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on productiv-
ity. He points out, however, that competition
and privatization might be complementary
measures, as he ﬁnds that competition increases
the performance of privatized ﬁrms.
Kikeri and Nellis (2004) point out that the
mounting empirical evidence of privatization’s
beneﬁts coincides with increasing dissatisfac-
tion and opposition among citizens and policy-
makers and they suggest strengthening the
eﬀects of privatization by deepening eﬀorts to
promote competition and regulatory frame-
works.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing
how privatization aﬀects market concentration
in an oligopolistic industry and by controlling
for market concentration in our analysis of
privatization eﬀects on allocative eﬃciency as
well as ﬁrm productivity.
(v) Privatization and corporate governance
There is an emerging literature on the impor-
tance of corporate governance in privatizationexperiments. By empirically testing the theoret-
ical predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
and Boubakri et al. (2005) ﬁnd that ownership
concentration is signiﬁcantly and positively re-
lated to post-privatization performance. Their
results suggest that large shareholders, whose
wealth depends on ﬁrm performance, have
more incentives to monitor management, and
ensure that their resources are not diverted.
Recent papers (Dharwadkar, 2000; Rama-
murti, 2000) have examined the situation in
emerging economies where neither capital
markets nor economic institutions are well
developed, emphasizing the importance of gov-
ernment’s residual ownership and the type of
capital the ﬁrm attracts to understand the re-
sults of privatization cases. Studies by Frydman
et al. (1999) and Villalonga (2000) point out to
foreign ownership as an important determinant
of ﬁrm eﬃciency for the privatized ﬁrms.
In our study, we have data on the identity
of buyers which allows us to diﬀerentiate the
eﬀects of foreign versus domestic ownership
on privatization outcomes. Unfortunately, our
sample does not allow us to examine the eﬀects
of ownership concentration on ﬁrm perfor-
mance. Cement plants were privatized in total
via blocksales with the exception of two plants
which were partially sold in public oﬀerings.
This is not a suﬃcient variation to explore the
eﬀects of ownership concentration on ﬁrm per-
formance as well as the relative merits of the
two methods. 33. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
(a) Privatization in Turkey
Historically, Turkey has a long experience of
relying heavily on SOEs. SOEs were established
during the 1930s by the government to jump-
start the economy that had collapsed with the
end of the Ottoman era in 1923. Over the years
SOEs grew enormously, leaving the control of a
large section of the economy to bureaucrats
and politicians. Politicians exploited SOEs to
provide jobs to their constituents at the expense
of consumers, who were faced with higher
prices. Consequently, in the 1980s, SOEs began
to be perceived negatively due to poor ﬁnancial
performance, overstaﬃng, dependence on sub-
sidies, protected markets and corruption (Ert-
una, 1998).
After a Military Regime (1980–83), the ﬁrst
party that came to power was the Motherland
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Minister Turgut Ozal. Ozal was a strong
supporter of Thatcherism that promoted a
reduction of the state’s role in the economy.
Privatization ﬁrst entered the political agenda
with Ozal’s trade and capital account liberaliza-
tion program in 1984.
Despite this initial enthusiasm, the privatiza-
tion process has been slow. From its start in
1985 up to 2005, the total proceeds from priv-
atization eﬀorts have amounted to $9.4 billion.
More than half of this was realized in the 2000–
04 period after the 1999 IMF Stand By agree-
ment, which placed a particular emphasis on
privatization. Block sales have been the most
prevalent method of privatization.
The privatization reforms have not been fully
carried out as intended, due to the lack of a
legal framework, conﬂicting laws and a waver-
ing political will. Privatization eﬀorts faced
strong opposition by entrenched vested inter-
ests, notably senior bureaucrats in government
departments and SOEs, Workers’ Unions who
have expressed serious concern about the possi-
bility of mass lay oﬀs and leftist political parties
(Karatas, 2001). Still, numerous companies
have been privatized. The share of the public
sector in total value added manufacturing is
down from 40% in 1986 to 18.5% in 2000,
which is a 54% reduction.
(b) Privatization process in the cement industry
Cement is an extremely capital intensive
industry making entry into this sector diﬃcult.
Furthermore, high transportation costs via
land generally limit transportation of cement
to an area within two to three hundred kilome-
ters of any plant site. As a result, cement indus-
try in Turkey today is an oligopoly with about
eleven companies owning a total of 39 plants
and each plant is a local monopoly within its
surrounding area due to high transportation
costs. 4
The ﬁrst cement plant of Turkey was estab-
lished in 1911 by a private ﬁrm. By 1950, four
more private plants had been built. Only after
1950 did the cement industry develop on a large
scale by means of a government initiative. A
public enterprise, CISAN (Turkish acronym
for Turkish Cement Industry Co. later named
CITOSAN), was established in 1953 to build
15 plants in various regions. Before the privati-
zation of the cement plants began in 1989, the
public share in the cement industry was nearly
40% (Saygili & Taymaz, 2001). It is believedthat each plant was able to exercise some
monopoly power within its hinterland (Ertuna,
1998), most probably due to the distance be-
tween plants and the lack of proper transporta-
tion facilities in the public sector.
In 1986 a French company, Sema-Metra
Conceil, was contracted by the Turkish govern-
ment and the World Bank to prepare two re-
ports, one on the structural regulation of the
cement sector and privatization and the other
on the plan for the reorganization of CITO-
SAN. In the latter report, Sema-Metra Conceil
suggested that plants in the west be privatized
ﬁrst since they could be as proﬁtable as private
plants, and recommended that the eastern
plants be restructured prior to privatization.
The report also suggested privatization on a
plant-by-plant basis, as the sale of the state ﬁrm
as a single entity may have led to an unhealthy
monopoly (Tallant, 1993). In 1986, there was a
major change in the economic environment of
the cement plants. Prior to 1986, the Turkish
Cement Producers Association (TCPA) set
prices and market areas for all cement compa-
nies, however, after 1986 ﬁrms were encouraged
to operate independently and maximize proﬁts.
Sema-Metra’s ﬁrst report might have partially
led to this change.
Privatization in the cement industry started
in 1989, with the initial sale of ﬁve factories
to the French ﬁrm Cement Francais (SCF).
By 1998, the sale of 22 cement plants had been
completed. 5 Revenues from the sale of cement
plants amounted to about 20% (10%) of total
privatization revenues as of 1998 (2005). The
recommendations of the Sema-Metra report
were taken into consideration, and the western
plants were privatized ﬁrst. 6 It may also be the
case that the privatization of the eastern plants
was delayed, as the eastern region suﬀered from
unemployment and terrorism throughout the
1990s and the public enterprises were used as
means of employment.
Privatization of the cement plants was carried
out under the Privatization Administration of
Turkey. Most of the privatizations were real-
ized through block sales using closed-bid
auctions and through a combination of block
sales and public oﬀerings in a few cases. Table
1 presents all plants that were privatized, with
their establishment and privatization dates
and the names of their buyers.
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) pointed out that
holding companies had a tendency to acquire
plants in speciﬁc regions. For instance, Rumeli
Holding bought plants in the eastern region
Table 1. The privatized cement factories in Turkey
Company Established
in
Privatized
in
Buyer
Afyon 1955 1989 Ciment
Francais
Ankara 1926 1989 Ciment
Francais
Balikesir 1958 1989 Ciment
Francais
Pinarhisar 1958 1989 Ciment
Francais
Soke 1955 1989 Ciment
Francais
Corum 1959 1992 Yibitas
Denizli 1987 1992 Modern
Gaziantep 1957 1992 Rumeli
Nigde 1957 1992 OYAK-
SABANCI
Sivas 1943 1992 Yibitas
Trabzon 1966 1992 Rumeli
Askale 1968 1993 Ercimsan
Bartin 1962 1993 Rumeli
Ladik 1983 1993 Rumeli
Sanliurfa 1986 1993 Rumeli
Adiyaman 1983 1995 Teksko
Elazig 1954 1996 OYAK-GAMA
Lalapasa 1991 1996 Rumeli
Kars 1969 1996 Cimentas
Van 1966 1996 Rumeli
Ergani 1984 1997 Rumeli
Kurtalan 1976 1998 Canlar
Otomotiv
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Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK) and
Sabanci Holding, one of the biggest holding
companies in Turkey, formed an alliance and
purchased companies in Central Anatolia,
Southern Anatolia and Marmara regions. Set
Cement Holding (a subsidiary of Italcementi
which merged with Ciment Francais) focused
on Central and Western regions, and ﬁnally,
Lafarge and Yibitas own cement plants in
neighboring provinces of Central Anatolia.
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) argued that privati-
zation through block sales, instead of public
oﬀerings in the stock market, gave rise to bigger
regional monopolies. According to the report
of the Central Anatolian Board of Export,
however, the privatization of public cement
plants increased competition in the industry
and decreased prices.
In order to gather some anecdotal evidence,
we asked the managers of the privatized cement
plants their views on the eﬀects of privatizationin their sector. Six managers out of 22 were
willing to share their views under the condition
of strict anonymity. They all indicated that
their plants increased productivity drastically
as a result of privatization. Five out of the six
managers rated the introduction of new pro-
duction methods and automation as the most
important factor in this improvement. One
manager rated the changed incentives of
employees as the most important factor, while
he rated automation as a very important de-
terminant of increased productivity. They all
indicated that their capacity and output have
increased as a result of privatization and that
proﬁt margins have been falling due to ﬁerce
competition and the recent decline in aggregate
demand due to the economic crisis in 2002.
Today, the Turkish cement industry consists
of 39 private plants, some owned by giant
industrial holdings and others by small one-
plant companies. There are four foreign inves-
tors in the industry, namely, French Lafarge
Coppee, Ciment Vicat, German Heidelberger
Zement/CBR, and Italian Italcementi. Cement
consumption continues to grow at sound levels
and Turkey continues to be a major exporter of
cement. Turkey is the largest exporter and third
largest producer of cement in Europe and
second largest exporter and 12th largest pro-
ducer of cement in the world (OAIB, Cimento
Sektoru Raporu, 2003).4. DATA
All of the Turkish publicly owned cement
plants were privatized during 1989–98. Since
our sample includes all of these plants with
their pre- and post-privatization data, we are
able to look at a more complete picture of priv-
atization and avoid the problem of endogeneity
associated with sample selection. The privatiza-
tion of the public cement plants in Turkey is
like a natural experiment that allows us to
examine the eﬀects of privatization in an almost
ideal setting.
Our data spans a period from 1983 to 1999
for many of the variables of interest, though
the time series is shorter for some variables
and the panel is not always balanced. Our data
on output, employment and investment are
constructed from the oﬃcial statistics of the
Privatization Administration of Turkey. Our
data on capital and sales are constructed from
the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s surveys
(ISO500) conducted on the 500 largest ﬁrms
Table 2. Description of variables
Variable Description
Capacity The minimum eﬃcient scale of the ﬁrm, measured in tons scaled by 1,000
Capital Assets measured in Turkish Liras, deﬂated by the wholesale price index of
Central Bank of Turkey, 1987 = 100 and scaled by 1,000,000
Capital/labor ratio Capital divided by number of workers
Herﬁndahl index (HHI) A measure of market concentration, which is calculated by summing the squares of
ﬁrms’ market shares
Investment The investment expenditures of the ﬁrm, measured in Turkish Liras, deﬂated by the
wholesale price index and scaled by 1,000,000
Labor The number of workers employed by the ﬁrm
Labor productivity Per capita cement production, measured in tons
Output Output sold by the ﬁrm, measured in tons scaled by 1,000
Prices The sale price per ton, deﬂated by wholesale price index and scaled by 1,000,000
Relative inﬂation rate Firm price inﬂation rate minus wholesale price inﬂation rate
Sales Sales measured in Turkish Liras, deﬂated by the price index and scaled by 1,000,000
1544 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof Turkey. We also have sales and employment
data on privately owned plants from ISO500
that we use in a robustness check. Table 2 de-
scribes the variables used in our analysis.
There are a few other empirical studies
that analyze the impact of privatization on
the Turkish cement industry (Ozmucur, 1998;
Saygili & Taymaz, 2001; Tallant, 1993). These
studies focus on the eﬀects of privatization
on ﬁrm productivity and do not analyze how
privatization aﬀects allocative eﬃciency, mar-
ket structure and input choice. Also, their
analysis does not extend beyond 1995 and
hence at least six plants are treated as public
during the study period.
Interestingly, their results on ﬁrm productiv-
ity are mixed. Ozmucur (1998) analyzes a panel
of public and private cement establishments,
using the results of the Istanbul Chamber of
Industry’s surveys on the 500 largest ﬁrms of
Turkey. He estimates a separate equation for
each ﬁrm to determine the year of structural
change for employment and labor productivity
for the 1981–95 period. He ﬁnds that structural
change coincided with time of privatization
for public ﬁrms and reduction in employment,
which to a degree happened in all ﬁrms, was
signiﬁcantly higher in the privatized ﬁrms.
Tallant (1993) analyzes the relative eﬃciency
of public sector with respect to the private
sector in Turkish cement industry in a cross-
sectional study. He ﬁnds that private plants
are more eﬃcient in terms of productivity and
capacity utilization. However, he argues that
the better showing in physical measures is clo-
sely related to geographic location as western
plants perform better, which indicates that theinitial location decision has had more to do
with ﬁrm performance than public ownership
per se.
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) analyze the eﬀects
of ownership and privatization on technical
eﬃciency using a panel data set of public and
private cement plants for the years 1980–95
and measure the relative performance of pri-
vate or privatized ﬁrms with respect to the six
plants that remain public during the study per-
iod. In fact since they lack post-privatization
data for two other plants (Adiyaman and Ask-
ale), they have eight plants in their comparison
group. They ﬁnd that private plants were
clearly more eﬃcient than the comparison
group, but the average technical eﬃciency of
private plants and public plants privatized
in 1989 revealed no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence.
How can we reconcile the diﬀerences in re-
sults as to the eﬀects of privatization on ﬁrm
eﬃciency? One explanation can be the diﬀer-
ences in the competitive environments of these
plants. Perhaps plants privatized in 1989 per-
formed as well as private plants due to a more
competitive environment in the western regions
where they coexisted with private plants. In our
empirical analysis, we will control for the
market structure and hence the competitive
environment when we measure the eﬀects of
privatization. Another explanation is perhaps
in the diﬀerences in the questions asked. The
studies of Tallant, Saygili, and Taymaz ask
how private plants compare with public ones.
Whereas Ozmucur and our study focus on
how privatization aﬀects performance. Since
we have post-privatization data for plants priv-
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON EFFICIENCY 1545atized in the 1995–98 period, we can test the ef-
fects of privatization on eastern plants which
were privatized later as well as western plants
which were privatized earlier.5. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
We evaluate the impact of privatization on
ﬁrm performance by adopting the following
framework:
yit ¼ aP it þ bX it þ li þ dtDt þ eit;
where i denotes plant i and t denotes year t, yit
is the outcome variable of interest such as
labor productivity price, and Pit is the treat-
ment variable (privatization eﬀect) that is equal
to 1 if year t is a post-privatization period for
ﬁrm i and 0 otherwise, and Xit is a vector of
additional regressors that we use in some
speciﬁcations.
One important regressor in Xit is the HHI of
the region in which the plant is located. The
HHI is obtained by summing the squares of
the regional market shares of cement compa-
nies. We use HHI to measure the eﬀects of priv-
atization that operate through the changes in
the ﬁrm’s competitive environment. This speci-
ﬁcation allows us to diﬀerentiate between the
eﬀects of private ownership and the eﬀects of
changes in market structure due to privatiza-
tion reforms. li is the plant ﬁxed eﬀect and Dt
is a dummy which is equal to 1 in year t andTable 3. Comparison of means three y
Variable Number of obs. Before privatiz
Labor productivity 22 1,167.
(84.9
Price 21 0.03
(0.00
Labor 22 314.8
(12.4
Capital 15 10,026
(1743.
Capital labor ratio 15 30.6
(5.96
Investment 22 825.6
(229.3
a Data from the three years before and after the year of p
after privatization data sets, respectively. If data were missin
(post-) privatization period, then we also excluded the sym
ensure that the comparison is symmetric.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.is 0 otherwise. Coeﬃcient a will capture the ef-
fect of privatization on our outcome variable.
The above equation denotes our standard base-
line regression.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Table 3 presents the comparison of the three
year averages of the variables of interest before
and after privatization. Our results indicate
that labor productivity, investment and capital
are signiﬁcantly higher, whereas prices and
employment are signiﬁcantly lower in the
post-privatization period. Although labor
productivity is signiﬁcantly higher in the post-
privatization period, it is still less than average
productivity in the cement sector in the world
outside of China which was about 3,600 tons
per employee in the year 2000 according to a
report by Klee (2003).
In the rest of the paper, we analyze the eﬀects
of privatization on productive and allocative
eﬃciency using panel data methods and hence
make full use of the richness of our data set.
Our objectives are to (1) check whether the
results listed in Table 3 withstand a rigorous
econometric treatment where we use panel data
methods with ﬁrm-speciﬁc and period-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects, (2) examine potential factors such
as ownership type (foreign versus domestic),
work force reductions, choice of capital inten-
sity and investment and changes in competitiveears before and after privatizationa
ation mean After privatization mean t-Statistics
212 2,132.207 6.08***
9) (166.58)
6 0.033 2.31**
2) (0.001)
3 204.31 8.40***
7) (10.98)
.51 16,978.18 2.73***
58) (3356.05)
0 88.21 3.98***
) (18.18)
8 2,158.24 2.60***
0) (510.06)
rivatization are included in the before privatization and
g for one or two of these years for a given ﬁrm in the pre-
metric year in the post- (pre-) privatization period to
1546 WORLD DEVELOPMENTenvironment that may have contributed to
improvements in eﬃciency.
(a) Privatization and productive eﬃciency
Regressions 1–4, presented in Table 4, show
the eﬀects of privatization on labor productiv-
ity (in logs). We have controlled for ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc and period-speciﬁc eﬀects by adopting a
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation and including year
dummies. We observe that privatization has a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor prod-
uctivity in Regression 1. A switch from public
ownership to private ownership increases labor
productivity by 24%. 7 In Regression 2, we
break down the eﬀect of privatization accord-
ing to the type of buyer and have two diﬀerent
dummy variables: domestic and foreign.
Domestic (foreign) is equal to 1 in the post-
privatization period if the plant is purchased
by a domestic (foreign) buyer. Both variables
have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor
productivity. This result contrasts with the
studies conducted by Frydman et al. (1999)
and Villalonga (2000) that point out foreign
ownership as an important determinant of ﬁrm
eﬃciency for the privatized ﬁrms.
In Regression 3, we also control for log of the
capital labor ratio in addition to the controlsTable 4. Privatization and eﬃciency meth
Dependent variable Productiv
Labor
productivity
(log)
Labor
productivity
(log)
(1) (2)
Privatization eﬀect 0.215***
(5.00)
Domestic 0.206***
(4.74)
Foreign 0.282***
(3.88)
Capital labor ratio (log)
Year dummies Yes Yes
F-statistic 103.94 F = 98.05
Overall R2 0.563 0.581
Test statistic for plant
eﬀects (p-value)
F = 30.71 F = 29.17
(0.00) (0.00)
Number of observations 266 266
t-Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.used in Regression 1. We can interpret Regres-
sion 3 as a Cobb–Douglas production function
speciﬁcation. 8 The privatization eﬀect remains
positive and signiﬁcant though the increase in
labor productivity drops from 24% to 21%
when we control for the capital labor ratio.
The capital labor ratio, as expected, has a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity
though its coeﬃcient is smaller than expected.
Regression 4 replicates Regression 2 including
capital labor ratio as an explanatory variable.
Once again both domestic and foreign types
of ownerships are found to have positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity of priv-
atized plants. Hence, we conclude that privati-
zation has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
productive eﬃciency.
(b) Privatization and allocative eﬃciency
In Table 4, Regressions 5 and 6 present the
eﬀects of privatization on allocative eﬃciency.
Our measures for allocative eﬃciency are plant
speciﬁc cement prices (in log) and the relative
inﬂation rate. The relative inﬂation rate is cal-
culated by subtracting the wholesale price index
inﬂation rate from the plant price inﬂation rate.
We know that prior to the price deregulation in
1986, the price of each publicly owned plantod: ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (ﬁrm level)
e eﬃciency Allocative eﬃciency
Labor
productivity
(log) C  D
Labor
productivity
(log) C  D
Price
(log)
Relative
inﬂation
rate
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.188*** 0.392* 0.085*
(3.47) (1.79) (1.91)
0.196***
(3.44)
0.165**
(2.22)
0.135*** 0.139***
(3.89) (3.88)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
F = 69.77 F = 65.50 46.71 41.76
0.760 0.761 0.696 0.706
F = 10.26 F = 10.18 F = 5.27 F = 0.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94)
165 165 194 329
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public enterprise. Unfortunately, we do not
have data on these prices but we have an indus-
try-wide price index from the State Planning
Institute of Turkey. Hence, we calculate the
plant price inﬂation rate by using this indus-
try-wide price index prior to 1986, and by using
plant speciﬁc prices post-1986. Since this vari-
able merely indicates rate of change, it is possi-
ble to construct it using two diﬀerent price
indices as long as we code the year for which
we switch from one index to the next as miss-
ing. Our goal in constructing the relative inﬂa-
tion rate is to achieve a longer series on price.
Both regressions control for plant speciﬁc and
period speciﬁc eﬀects by adopting a ﬁrm ﬁxed
eﬀect speciﬁcation and including year dummies.
We ﬁnd that privatization decreases both ce-
ment prices and the relative inﬂation rate. A
switch from public ownership to private owner-
ship decreases cement prices by 32%. This ﬁnd-
ing is in sharp contrast to most of the earlier
studies, which ﬁnd that privatization results
in an increase in prices (La Porta & Lopez-de-
Silanes, 1999; Saal & Parker, 2001). Hence,
the link between privatization and allocative
eﬃciency needs to be more closely examined.
Changes in market structure resulting from
privatization may be responsible for our results.
We will explore this angle in Section 6(d).Table 5. Privatization and input choice met
Dependent
variable
Labor
(log)
Labor
(log)
Capital
(log)
C
(
(1) (2) (3)
Privatization
eﬀect
0.238*** 0.385***
(5.92) (3.75)
Domestic 0.243*** 0
(5.98) (
Foreign 0.190*** 0.
(2.79) (
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 61.72 58.07 11.09 1
Overall R2 0.741 0.742 0.228 0
Test statistics for
the equality of
ﬁrm eﬀects
(p-value)
F = 5.88 F = 5.79 F = 29.80 F =
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (
Number of
observations
266 266 243
t-Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.(c) Privatization and input choice
How does a privatized ﬁrm change its pro-
duction process to improve its productive eﬃ-
ciency? To answer this question, we analyze
how privatization aﬀects a ﬁrm’s input choices.
Our dependent variables in these regressions
are labor, capital, capital labor ratio and invest-
ment (all in logs). All regressions, presented in
Table 5, control for plant speciﬁc and period
speciﬁc eﬀects by adopting a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
speciﬁcation and including year dummies. We
ﬁnd that privatization has a negative and signif-
icant eﬀect on labor (Regression 1) and this ef-
fect exists for both domestic and foreign buyer
privatizations (Regression 2).
Although privatization has a positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on capital (Regression 3), when
we diﬀerentiate the privatization eﬀect accord-
ing to the type of buyer, we no longer ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect for plants privatized to domestic
buyers (Regression 4). Furthermore, the coeﬃ-
cient on the foreign dummy is positive, signiﬁ-
cant and quite large. This is an interesting
result and indicates the importance of foreign
buyers in increasing capital endowment of priv-
atized plants. Capital labor ratio increases as
a result of privatization for all plant types
(Regressions 5 and 6). This must result from
work force reductions for all privatized plants.hod: ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (ﬁrm level)
apital
log)
Capital/
labor
ratio (log)
Capital/
labor
ratio (log)
Investment
(log)
Investment
(log)
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.418*** 0.786**
(3.16) (2.08)
.126 0.292** 0.597
1.11) (2.11) (1.59)
702*** 0.717*** 2.297***
5.82) (4.15) (3.70)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2.59 26.20 26.17 1.40 1.91
.248 0.510 0.530 0.090 0.16
29.80 F = 14.95 F = 14.92 F = 4.56 F = 4.36
0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
243 165 165 260 260
1548 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAs expected, our results on investment are sim-
ilar to the ones obtained on capital. While the
overall eﬀect of privatization on investment is
found to be positive and signiﬁcant (Regres-
sions 7), this eﬀect disappears for plants priv-
atized to domestic buyers and is enhanced for
plants privatized to foreign buyers (Regression
8).
These results suggest that privatized plants
reduce their work force signiﬁcantly and plants
privatized to foreign ﬁrms also increase their
capital signiﬁcantly. A switch from public to
private ownership decreases the number of
workers employed by 21% and increases the
capital endowment by 47% though increases
in capital are mostly due to privatizations to
foreign buyers. Upon privatization, an average
plant increases its investment by more than
100%. The reduction in the number of emp-
loyees as plants are privatized indicates the
presence of excess and wasteful employment
practices in the public sector. The drastic in-
crease in investment and capital utilization
accompanying the reduction in labor, however,
also indicate a switch to a more capital inten-
sive technology for plants privatized to foreign1500
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Figure 1. The eﬀects of privatization on market structure. M
(HHI ¼Pni¼1s2i where si is the market share (in %) of plant i
plants are owned by the same parent company, then market
HHI(1) is the Herﬁndahl index including the publicly owned
calculating HHI(1), share of output sold by publicly owned ﬁ
enterprise. In calculating HHI(2), only output sold by priva
year of privatizations in the regbuyers. We should also note that the drastic in-
crease in capital (assets) implies that the rate of
return on assets, a variable often used in empir-
ical studies of privatization, may not be an
appropriate measure of performance in the
short-run.
(d) Privatization and market structure
Privatization may aﬀect productive and allo-
cative eﬃciency in two ways. The ﬁrst of these
is the pure ownership eﬀect; a public ﬁrm may
experience a signiﬁcant change in its objective
function upon privatization as discussed in
the theoretical literature section (ownership ef-
fect). Second, privatization may inﬂuence the
market structure in which the ﬁrm operates
and hence change the constraints faced by the
ﬁrm (environment eﬀect). In this section, we
will examine the second eﬀect more closely
and determine whether we still observe an own-
ership eﬀect on eﬃciency when we control for
the eﬀect of privatization on market structure.
Figures 1 and 2 present time series data for
the region speciﬁc HHI for a western region
(Marmara Region) and for an eastern region0 92 94 96 98 100
HHI(1)
A REGION
arket concentration measured by Herﬁndahl index (HHI)
and n is the number of plants in the region. If two or more
share of the parent company in the region is used for si.
ﬁrms and HHI(2) excluding the publicly owned ﬁrms. In
rms is considered as the share of a single ﬁrm—the public
tely owned ﬁrms is considered. Vertical lines indicate the
ion.). A region in the West.
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Figure 2. The eﬀects of privatization on market structure. Market concentration measured by Herﬁndahl index (HHI)
(HHI ¼Pni¼1s2i where si is the market share (in %) of plant i and n is the number of plants in the region. If two or more
plants are owned by the same parent company, then market share of the parent company in the region is used for si.
HHI(1) is the Herﬁndahl index including the publicly owned ﬁrms and HHI(2) excluding the publicly owned ﬁrms. In
calculating HHI(1), share of output sold by publicly owned ﬁrms is considered as the share of a single ﬁrm—the public
enterprise. In calculating HHI(2), only output sold by privately owned ﬁrms is considered. Vertical lines indicate the
year of privatizations in the region.). A region in the East. Source: Constructed using plant level regional market share
statistics from Turkish Cement Association.
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON EFFICIENCY 1549(Eastern Anatolia Region), respectively. The
time series spans the period from 1980 to
2000. The HHI is calculated by summing the
squares of market shares of cement plants in
each region. If two or more plants are owned
by the same company, then the market share
of the parent company in the region is used in
the calculation. The higher the HHI is, the
more concentrated the market will be. HHI(1)
is the total HHI including the publicly owned
plants and HHI(2) is the HHI excluding the
publicly owned plants. In other words, in calcu-
lating HHI(1) we consider the share of output
sold by publicly owned plants as the share of
a single ﬁrm—the public enterprise. In calculat-
ing HHI(2), we only consider the output sold
by privately owned plants (including privatized
plants) and base our measure on how this
private output is shared among the privately
owned ﬁrms.
In Figures 1 and 2, the vertical lines on
graphs indicate years in which privatizations
took place in that region. The graphs suggest
that HHI(1) increases in Marmara region anddecreases in Eastern Anatolia Region. Further-
more, before privatization there seems to be a
relatively competitive environment in the Mar-
mara region, while Eastern Anatolia region did
not have a single private plant. We should note
that Marmara region is the most populous
region, with the largest economy, in Turkey.
Graphs for other regions are not presented
but are available upon request. These graphs
indicate that HHI(1) decreases in the Central
and Southeast Anatolia regions after privatiza-
tion, while there does not seem to be a signiﬁ-
cant change in HHI(1) in the Aegean and
Black Sea regions.
These striking diﬀerences in the market struc-
tures of western and eastern regions before
privatization might be partially responsible
for the ﬁndings of earlier studies. Saygili and
Taymaz (2001) ﬁnd that public plants located
in the west were not that diﬀerent from private
ones, while public plants located in the east
were performing more poorly. Similarly, Tal-
lant (1993) in his comparison of public plants
with private ones points out that public plants
1550 WORLD DEVELOPMENTlocated in the east were signiﬁcantly worse
performers than private ones. Hence, a com-
petitive environment might be important in
determining the ﬁrm’s performance. Therefore,
we should analyze the eﬀect of privatization on
market structure more closely.
In order to have a more in-depth analysis
of how privatization aﬀects market structure,
we present OLS regression results using the
HHI(1) data. Here our unit of analysis is a re-
gion of Turkey and our dependent variable is
HHI(1) in that region. For example in the ﬁrst
regression of Table 6, our dependent variable is
HHI(1) in the Marmara region. Our explana-
tory variables, dummy89 and dummy96, con-
trol for the structural shifts induced by the
privatizations of 1989 and 1996 in the Marmara
region. Dummy89 (dummy96) is equal to 1 in
the post-1989 (1996) period and 0 otherwise.
Since privatization years may diﬀer across
regions, the dummies used may diﬀer across
regressions. In general, our regression results
seem to conﬁrm our observations in the graphs.
Privatization increases HHI in the Marmara
region and decreases it in East and Southeast
Anatolia regions. There is a mixed evidence
for the Black Sea, Central Anatolia and Aegean
regions.Table 6. Privatization eﬀects on market con
Dependent
variable
HHI
(Marmara)
HHI
(Aegean)
HHI
(Central Anato
Dummy89 38.035 90.666 1,176.36***
(0.57) (0.82) (13.15)
Dummy92 138.291 432.191***
(1.21) (4.70)
Dummy93
Dummy95
Dummy96 430.765***
(5.11)
Dummy97
Dummy98
F-statistic 18.57 4.10 116.46
R2 0.674 0.313 0.9283
Number of
observations
21 21 21
t-Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.Our ﬁrst lesson here is that even for the same
industry, diﬀerent plants may face diﬀerent
competitive environments when transportation
costs are important. Another lesson is that mul-
tiple industry studies of privatization (most
empirical studies are of this kind) are likely to
mask diﬀerences in market structure in which
these ﬁrms operate. It is highly unlikely that
privatization will have the same eﬀect on mar-
ket structure in every industry. To lump all
these diﬀerent eﬀects into one privatization
variable may be misleading.
We next examine how privatization aﬀects
productive and allocative eﬃciency when we
control for the changes in market structure.
Here our goal is to diﬀerentiate the ownership
eﬀect of privatization from its eﬀects on the
market structure and the competitive environ-
ment. Hence, we add two additional controls
to our baseline regressions in Table 4: HHI(1)
and a deregulation dummy (dummy86), which
is equal to 1 post-1986 and is 0 otherwise.
Deregulation dummy controls for the price
deregulation which took place prior to the start
of the privatization reforms. We present these
results in Table 7.
The eﬀects of privatization on productive eﬃ-
ciency remain virtually unchanged as shown incentration method: ordinary least squares
lia)
HHI
(Black Sea)
HHI
(East Anatolia)
HHI (Southeast
Anatolia)
2,260.206*** 2,503.593***
(11.69) (3.99)
963.040*** 4,635.199*** 398.664
(4.47) (148.30) (0.54)
864.933
(1.43)
291.232* 2,497.09**
(2.05) (66.55)
540.056
(0.73)
451.837
(0.61)
88.99 37,740.35 34.44
0.940 0.998 0.9199
21 21 21
Table 7. Privatization eﬀects controlling for market structure method: ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (ﬁrm level)
Dependent variable Productive eﬃciency Allocative eﬃciency Capacity utilization
rate (%)Labor
productivity
(log)
Price
(log)
Price
(log)
Relative
inﬂation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Privatization eﬀect 0.217*** 0.028 0.013 0.091** 0.0135
(4.90) (1.17) (0.51) (2.06) (0.38)
HHIa (in 1000) 0.002 0.007 0.010*** 0.013 0.038***
(0.20) (1.23) (2.05) (1.33) (-4.84)
Deregulation eﬀect (dummy86) 0.970*** 0.375*** 0.130
(8.97) (3.48) (1.48)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic 97.42 43.37 43.69 39.64 4.48
Overall R2 0.56 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.04
Test statistic for the equality
of ﬁrm eﬀects (p-value)
F = 28.85 F = 5.33 F = 5.49 F = 0.54 F = 14.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of observations 266 194 193 329 266
t-Statistics are in parentheses.
a HHI(1) is used in all regressions except for Regression 3 where HHI(2) is used.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON EFFICIENCY 1551Regression 1. Privatization has still a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity.
HHI(1) is insigniﬁcant in this regression,
whereas dummy86 is positive and signiﬁcant. 9
However, we do observe some changes in the ef-
fects of privatization on allocative eﬃciency
when we control for the market structure. In
the price regression (Regression 2), the privati-
zation eﬀect, while still negative, is no longer
signiﬁcant and HHI(1) is positive though insig-
niﬁcant. Regression 3 is the same as Regression
2 where our dependent variable is again log
price, but with one diﬀerence: HHI(2) is used
as a regressor instead of HHI(1). The results
are striking. Privatization is no longer signiﬁ-
cant but HHI(2) is positive and signiﬁcant. This
indicates the importance of market concentra-
tion in determining price. The more concen-
trated a market, is the higher the price will be.
The privatization eﬀect remains negative and
signiﬁcant in the relative inﬂation regression
with HHI(1), but loses signiﬁcance if HHI(2) is
used instead. 10 Since our panel is short for the
price variable, we are not able to include a price
deregulation dummy in Regressions 2 and 3.
These results highlight the importance of
diﬀerentiating ownership and environment
(market structure) eﬀects of privatization. Own-
ership eﬀect is suﬃcient to achieve gains in labor
productivity but not in allocative eﬃciency.
Clearly the objective function of the ﬁrmchanges with changing ownership type. Proﬁt
motive appears suﬃcient to achieve gains in
productive eﬃciency. However, controlling for
changes in market structure, we do not ﬁnd that
the increase in productive eﬃciency due to pri-
vate ownership will beneﬁt consumers in the
form of lower prices. Since cement industry is
an oligopoly, market concentration is important
in determining the competitive environment fol-
lowing privatization. According to standard
models of oligopoly theory in homogeneous
product industries such as cement (e.g., the
Cournot model), prices are a decreasing func-
tion ofmarginal costs and an increasing function
of market concentration. While privatization
may lower the marginal costs of the ﬁrm due
to increased labor productivity, it may very well
increase market concentration if plants are sold
to incumbent ﬁrms in the industry.
Advocates of privatization often hope that
more productively eﬃcient ﬁrms will reﬂect
these eﬃciency gains in their prices and ignore
the eﬀects of privatization on market concen-
tration and competitive environment. Our
results show that it is crucial to analyze the
market structure ensuing from privatization
when privatization reforms are considered.
There is often too much emphasis on revenue
generation and productive eﬃciency aspects of
privatization, with little attention paid to allo-
cative eﬃciency.
1552 WORLD DEVELOPMENTWe admit that our geographical regions are
crude measures of the appropriate market for
each ﬁrm. It is possible that a plant in one
region may sell in a neighboring region. Since
our HHI measures are based on these geo-
graphical regions, one might question whether
they are good measures of market concentra-
tion. To test the reliability of our HHI mea-
sures, we estimate the eﬀects of HHI(1) on the
capacity utilization rate. Here the hypothesis
(which is based on standard models of oligo-
poly) is that in more concentrated markets
(HHI high), ﬁrms have more market power to
inﬂuence price by restricting output and reduc-
ing their capacity utilization rates. Our last
regression in Table 7 presents this regression
where the capacity utilization rate is the depen-
dent variable. We ﬁnd evidence conﬁrming this
hypothesis; HHI has a negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on capacity utilization rate, while privati-
zation has a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
This ﬁnding strengthens our conﬁdence in our
HHI as a measure for market concentration/
power in the industry.
(e) Robustness checks
(i) Controlling for the business cycles
Our yearly dummies may not accurately cap-
ture the eﬀects of the business cycle on our ﬁrm
performance measures. It would be interesting
to see (1) how our measures move with the
business cycle; and (2) whether the privatiza-
tion eﬀect is sensitive to controlling for the
changes in the aggregate economy.Table 8. Privatization eﬀects controlling for the busine
Dependent variable Labor productivity
(log)
Privatization eﬀect 0.215***
(5.00)
Industrial production index 0.021***
(10.88)
Year dummies Yes
F-statistic 103.94
R2 0.563
Test statistic for the equality
of ﬁrm eﬀects (p-value)
F = 30.71
(0.00)
Number of observations 266
t-Statistics are in parentheses.
a Average sales productivity of privately owned cement pla
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.Hence, we present our results controlling for
an industry production index which measures
the production level in total manufacturing
industries (Table 8). In Regressions 1, 3 and
4, the dependent variables are our measures
of productive eﬃciency (labor productivity)
and allocative eﬃciency (price and the relative
inﬂation rate).
The privatization eﬀect remains positive and
signiﬁcant consistent with our earlier results
on productive eﬃciency (Regression 1). Indus-
try production index is positive and signiﬁcant
in the labor productivity regression, which is
in line with our expectations. We expect a
plant’s output to be pro-cyclical. If the increase
in a plant’s labor utilization does not increase
as much as its output, this would result in gains
in productivity. The privatization eﬀect remains
negative and signiﬁcant in the price and relative
inﬂation rate regressions, which is also con-
sistent with our earlier results on allocative
eﬃciency (Regressions 3 and 4). Industry pro-
duction index is negative and signiﬁcant in the
price and relative inﬂation regressions. This
result is consistent with the ﬁndings of a recent
paper on the Turkish economy, which shows
that price and inﬂation are counter cyclical
and argues that this constitutes a supply-driven
model for the Turkish economy (Alper, 2004).
A second approach to controlling business
cycle eﬀects is comparing the performance of
plants in our sample (sample A) with the aver-
age performance of a sample of private plants
(sample B) in the industry. Plants in sample B
have always been privately owned, whereasss cycle method: ﬁxed eﬀects estimation (ﬁrm level)
Productivity
diﬀerencea
Price
(log)
Relative
inﬂation
24.295*** 0.039* 0.085*
(6.03) (1.79) (1.91)
0.870*** 0.009*** 0.003**
(5.55) (7.04) (2.35)
Yes Yes Yes
28.23 46.71 41.76
0.566 0.696 0.701
F = 10.10 F = 5.27 F = 0.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.94)
247 194 329
nts minus sales productivity of privatized plant i.
Table 9. Privatization and eﬃciency method: random
eﬀects estimation (ﬁrm level)
Dependent
variable
Labor
productivity
(log)
Price
(log)
Relative
inﬂation
Privatization
eﬀect
0.229*** 0.031 0.084**
(5.36) (1.49) (2.09)
Black Sea
region dummy
0.213 0.543 0.075*
(0.99) (1.06) (1.89)
Agean region
dummy
0.098 0.036 0.037
(0.26) (0.62) (0.81)
Central Anatolia
region dummy
0.063 0.044 0.079**
(0.30) (0.90) (2.00)
East Anatolia
region dummy
0.616*** 0.031 0.075*
(2.87) (0.62) (1.82)
Southeast
Anatolia
region dummy
-0.380* 0.098** 0.054
(1.85) (2.04) (1.38)
Wald statistic 1,649.76 580.57 753.95
Overall R2 0.70 0.734 0.711
Number of
observations
266 194 329
z-Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON EFFICIENCY 1553plants in sample A were publicly owned and
privatized. The average labor productivity in
sample A is higher than the average labor pro-
ductivity in sample B in a given year. In fact, in
sample A, labor productivity of a plant in a
given year is lower than the average labor
productivity in sample B in 234 out of 255
observations.
In Regression 2 of Table 8, the dependent
variable is constructed by subtracting labor
productivity of each plant in sample A from
average labor productivity in sample B in a
given year. We measure labor productivity
as sales divided by labor rather than output
divided by labor because we lack information
on output for private plants. If plants in sample
A improve their performance as a result of priv-
atization, then the performance gap between
them and plants in the private sector will
decrease in the post-privatization period. If
improvements in performance that we observe
occur industry-wide due to some business cycle
eﬀect or some other aggregate change in the
economy, then we do not expect any change
in the performance gap. We ﬁnd that produc-
tivity diﬀerence between privatized plant and
the private sector average does decrease after
privatization. We control for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
and include year dummies to control for period
eﬀects in this regression.
(ii) A random eﬀects speciﬁcation
One criticism of the privatization process in
the cement industry has been that better per-
forming plants which were located in the west
were privatized ﬁrst, while poor performing
plants in the east were privatized later (Saygili
& Taymaz, 2001). These authors also point
out that big conglomerates (holding com-
panies) had a tendency to acquire plants in
speciﬁc regions and this caused the creation of
regional monopolies in the cement industry
after privatization. Plants in the eastern regions
may also have been privatized last due to the
relative political instability of the region
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
In order to address the concern of unob-
served heterogeneity at the regional level, we
model the ﬁrm’s eﬀects as random and use
ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables such as regional dum-
mies as explanatory variables in our estimation.
We construct regional dummies for the
Marmara Region, Aegean Region, Black Sea
Region, Central Anatolia Region, Southeast
Anatolia and East Anatolia Region. The dum-
my that we leave out in this regression is thedummy for the Marmara Region and, hence,
the coeﬃcients of region dummies are relative
to those plants located in that region of Turkey.
In all regressions presented in Table 9, we con-
trol for the privatization eﬀect and time dum-
mies in addition to region dummies.
In general, the signs and signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients of the privatization eﬀect are the
same as those we found in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
regressions. One exception is the price regres-
sion (Regression 3), where the privatization ef-
fect though negative is no longer signiﬁcant.
This is consistent with our earlier results that
privatization has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on price
once we control for market structure using a
HHI. Region dummies serve as proxies for
the market structure within each region. The
coeﬃcients on East and Southeast Anatolia
dummies are negative in the labor productivity
regression, which supports the hypothesis that
eastern plants are less productive compared to
their western counterparts.
(iii) Controlling for diﬀerences in privatization
years
Privatization years of ﬁrms diﬀer in our sam-
ple, as shown in Table 1. One could argue that,
since better performing plants located in the
1554 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwestern region are privatized ﬁrst, our privati-
zation dummy is equal to 1 for these ﬁrms,
while it is equal to 0 for the others for some
of the years. Hence, the diﬀerence in perfor-
mance between plants privatized earlier and
plants privatized later might produce biased re-
sults. Hence, we group plants according to their
privatization years and re-estimate our eco-
nometric equations separately for each group.
For example, group 1 consists of plants that
are privatized in 1989, group 2 is composed of
plants privatized in 1992 and so on.
In general, our results for these sub-groups
remain consistent with our earlier results. We
ﬁnd that privatization has a positive and sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on labor productivity of plants
privatized in 1996 (and mostly located in the
eastern regions) as well as for those plants priv-
atized in 1989 (and located in the west) (not
shown but available upon request). We lose sig-
niﬁcance in our results for the six plants priv-
atized in 1993, 1997, and 1998. For the two
plants privatized in 1997 and 1998, there may
not be enough elapsed time in our data to exhi-
bit improvement in performance. Interestingly,
four of these six plants have been bought by the
Rumeli Conglomerate and this group has been
recently charged with criminal activity in their
business practices, both by Turkish and US
authorities. The Rumeli Cement Group’s man-
agement and control was taken over by Savings
Deposit and Insurance Fund of Turkey as of
February 2004. This may highlight the impor-
tance of buyer competence in the privatiza-
tion process in determining post-privatization
eﬃciency.7. CONCLUSION
According to Shirley and Walsh (2001), both
theoretical and empirical literature are not con-
clusive about the merits of private ownership in
monopolistic markets. We contribute to this lit-
erature with our analysis of privatization eﬀects
in the Turkish cement industry. This industry isan oligopoly as it consists of about eleven com-
panies owning 39 plants in total and each plant
has some monopoly power in its hinterland due
to high transportation costs.
Using a longitudinal data set of cement
plants, we ﬁnd that the privatized plants im-
prove their productive eﬃciency through work
force reductions. Interestingly, while plants
privatized to domestic buyers experience pro-
ductivity gains as well as plants privatized to
foreign companies, only the latter group in-
creases its investment and capital intensity.
Our data set also allows us to explore the ef-
fects of privatization on allocative eﬃciency,
which is an understudied topic in this ﬁeld.
Controlling for changes in market structure
with a market concentration index, we do not
ﬁnd that the gains in productive eﬃciency due
to private ownership will beneﬁt consumers in
the form of lower prices. While privatization
does not reduce prices, market concentration
tends to increase prices. Hence, it is crucial that
the market structure ensuing from privatiza-
tion is carefully analyzed as privatization re-
forms are considered. There is often too
much em- phasis on productive eﬃciency and
revenue generation aspects of privatization,
with little attention paid to allocative eﬃ-
ciency. Interestingly enough, privatization of
the Turkish Cement industry has led to an in-
crease in market concentration in some regions,
while it has increased competition in others.
Governments that are concerned with alloca-
tive eﬃciency should exercise caution in sale
of public enterprises to private ﬁrms that al-
ready have a signiﬁcant market share in the
industry.
Since we have pre- and post-privatization
data for all the cement plants which were once
public, we are able to avoid the endogeneity
problem associated with sample selection which
has been a problem for earlier research. Our
results withstand various robustness checks
addressing other possible problems associated
with sample selection and unobserved hetero-
geneity.NOTES1. When the last publicly owned cement plant was
privatized in 1998, Turkey was the seventh largest cement
producer in the world. In consequent years, a decrease in
production was caused by a decline in demand due to
ﬁnancial crisis and 1999 earthquake. Exports on theother hand increased by four times during 1990–2002
period and reached 9.9 million tons in 2002.
2. A survey conducted by Djankov and Murrell (2002)
examines the eﬀects of privatization in transition econ-
THE EFFECTS OF PRIVATIZATION ON EFFICIENCY 1555omies. They conclude that in most countries, privately
owned ﬁrms perform better than state owned ﬁrms.
3. Afyon and Nigde Cimento were the only two plants
that were sold through a combination of block sales and
public share oﬀerings. In case of Afyon Cimento, 51%
was sold via block sale in 1989 and the rest was sold in a
public oﬀering in 1991. All of Nigde Cimento was
oﬀered in a public oﬀering in 1991 but only 12% was
sold, the rest was sold via block sale to the OYAK-
Sabanci group.
4. Long distance transport via water is less expensive
and hence more common. This is the mode of transport
preferred for exports.
5. Also privatized were the two cement grinding
facilities. Since these were not full scale production
plants, we exclude them from our estimations.
6. Two exceptions were Denizli and Lalapasa. These
two public plants were established in 1987 and 1991,
respectively, in order to meet the growing demand in the
western regions.7. Results on economic signiﬁcance are calculated by
the following formula: exp(coeﬃcient  1).
8. Consider the Cobb–Douglas production function,
Y = KbL1b, where Y is output, K is capital and L is
labor. Dividing both sides by L, we get YL ¼ KL
 b
. The left
hand side of this equation is labor productivity and K/L
is capital labor ratio. We take the logarithm of both
sides and estimate this equation in Regression 3 of Table
4. The coeﬃcient on capital labor ratio is the estimate
for b.
9. Since price deregulation precedes the start of priv-
atization, we re-estimated the eﬀects of privatization
including three period dummies: the ﬁrst dummy is set
equal to one if the year is pre-deregulation, the second
dummy is set equal to one if it is post-deregulation but
pre-privatization, and the third dummy is set equal to
one if it is a post-privatization period for the ﬁrm. The
results of these estimations are consistent with our
ﬁndings and are available upon request.
10. The latter regression is not shown but is available
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